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Abstract*
 
 
Even though the OECD Model Tax Convention is not legally binding, both member and non-member 
States of the OECD have included reservations to express their disagreement with certain aspects. In order 
to explain why the number of reservations included varies so greatly from country to country, we have 
formulated several hypotheses which we have tested empirically. The results of our analysis show that being 
an OECD member (which is strongly and positively correlated with GDP per capita) or a net capital 
exporter are factors associated with fewer reservations. Thus, despite having a worldwide influence, the 
OECD Model serves better the interests of developed States. 
 
Aunque el Modelo Convenio Tributario de la OCDE no es jurídicamente vinculante, numerosos Estados, 
tanto miembros como no miembros de la OCDE, han incluido reservas para expresar su desacuerdo con 
ciertos aspectos, si bien su número difiere notablemente en función del país. Para explicar esta diferencia en 
el número de reservas hemos formulado y contrastado empíricamente diversas hipótesis. Los resultados del 
estudio muestran que ser un Estado miembro de la OCDE (característica que está fuerte y positivamente 
correlacionada con el PIB per cápita) o ser un exportador neto de capitales son factores asociados con menos 
reservas. Así pues, a pesar de su influencia global, el Modelo de la OCDE se adapta especialmente a los 
intereses de los países desarrollados. 
 
Título: El porqué de las reservas al Modelo de Convenio Tributario de la OCDE: una aproximación empírica 
 
Keywords: OECD Model Tax Convention, International Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Reservations 
Palabras clave: Modelo de Convenio Tributario de la OCDE, doble imposición internacional, tratados para evitar la 
doble imposición, reservas 
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1. Introduction and statement of the problem 
 
In order to prevent international double taxation, tax treaties distribute the taxing rights between 
the taxpayer’s country of residence and the country in which the income had its source. These 
treaties are almost always bilateral, but they are generally based on the OECD Model Tax 
Convention on Income and Capital. This model is not legally binding, so even though the OECD 
recommends that its member States follow it, they are free to deviate from it in their bilateral tax 
treaties. 
 
However, together with the model, reservations to articles and observations on their 
commentaries by OECD member States are also published. Moreover, since 1997, non-members 
have also been able to express their disagreement with certain aspects of the model and include 
positions on articles and commentaries. In this paper we will concentrate on disagreements with 
articles since they are probably more serious than disagreements with the merely official 
interpretation presented in the commentaries. Throughout the text, we will use the term 
“reservation” in a broad sense, referring both to member States’ reservations and non-members’ 
positions, because they have the same purpose: to show disagreement with the provisions of the 
OECD Model. In this sense, it is important to note that we are not using the term “reservation” 
with the technical meaning of Art. 2(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), 
precisely because the OECD Model Tax Convention is not a treaty but just a model. 
 
As can be observed in the following two graphs, the number of reservations by OECD member 
and non-member States to the OECD Model Tax Convention (as of 2010) is not homogeneous. 
Some member States, such as Austria and Iceland, have not included a single reservation. In 
contrast, Greece, the United States and Mexico disagree with more than 20 aspects in the articles 
of the model and their corresponding commentaries. Similarly, some OECD non-members have 
only included a few positions (fewer than many OECD members) while others, such as India, 
Brazil or Thailand, disagree with more than 35 aspects of the model.  
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FIGURE 1. Number of reservations to articles by OECD member States. 
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FIGURE 2. Number of positions to articles by non-member States of the OECD. 
 
 
These differences in the number of reservations are useful in helping us understand whose 
interests are favoured by the OECD Model. Moreover, the number of reservations should 
indirectly reflect a country’s influence in the decision-making process of the OECD. The reason 
for this is that countries more influential during the drafting of the model will not disagree with 
so many aspects of the final version and therefore will include fewer reservations. However, 
existing literature on double tax treaties, mainly by legal scholars such as VOGEL (1997), has 
concentrated on the detailed interpretation of the different provisions and the case law dealing 
with them.  
 
From a more analytical perspective, one of the main authors to study the role of double tax 
treaties in the framework of international tax governance is RIXEN (2008). Other authors, such as 
DAVIES (2004) and NEUMAYER (2007), have also studied particular aspects such as the impact that 
ratifying double tax treaties has had on foreign direct investment. Moreover, game-theoretic tools 
have also been used by authors such as DAGAN (2000) and BAISTROCCHI (2008) to explain the 
effects of double tax treaties on developing countries. 
 
Reservations to articles of the OECD Model Tax Convention have, however, not received the 
attention of analytical literature. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to fill this gap and test 
empirically several common assumptions about double tax treaties. We attempt to explain why 
certain States may include more or fewer reservations to the OECD Model. Even though the focus 
on the total number of reservations is based on the simplifying assumption that they are all of 
more or less equal importance, we consider that this is still an accurate indicator of a country’s 
level of agreement with the OECD Model. Consequently, this paper takes the same approach as 
scholars such as VOIGT (2009), who attempted to explain empirically the characteristics of certain 
legal texts, such as the length of constitutions. 
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In particular, we will focus on only those countries which actively participated in the 2010 
revision of the model. As the OECD does not provide information on the non-member countries 
that take part in annual meetings to discuss the OECD Model1
 
, we will only be able to consider 
all member States and those non-members which included at least one position. This could 
introduce a bias, since it cannot be ascertained if other non-member countries participated in the 
meetings but did not include any position because they agreed with all the provisions of the 
OECD Model. However, any bias introduced would be rather small, it seeming improbable that 
many non-members attending the meeting would agree with the whole model, when all but two 
member States expressed some form of disagreement with it. 
In this sense, we consider that the option to include every country in the world in our study (so 
as to take into account non-members who did not raise any position), and to assume that every 
nation could have participated in OECD meetings and included positions if they had wanted, 
would have been misleading. If countries such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or 
Somalia have not expressed any position, this is most probably not because they agree with all 
the aspects of the model, but for other heterogeneous reasons which may be difficult to measure 
empirically. For instance, these countries may not be interested in establishing double tax treaties 
or they may not have the technical expertise and resources to participate in the OECD. 
 
Consequently, we have decided to focus on those countries which have participated in the OECD 
(as members or as non-members with at least one reservation) because in those instances the 
number of reservations or positions should actually reflect these countries’ level of agreement 
with the OECD Model. Therefore, while this study cannot explain why countries generally 
include reservations to the model, it will examine the reasons why the countries that participate 
in the OECD decide to include more or fewer reservations. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
In order to explain why certain countries have included more reservations than others, we will 
consider the following explanations. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Net capital importing countries are expected to have more reservations than net 
capital exporting ones. 
 
It is generally considered that the OECD Model tends to favour the interests of net capital 
exporting countries, since it tends to promote taxation in the country of residence of the taxpayer. 
Hence, developing countries requested the United Nations to address this issue. The result was 
the publication of the UN Model Tax Convention in 1980, which gives more weight to the 
principle of taxation of income in the country where it had its source. Consequently, net capital 
                                                        
1 These meetings with some non-member countries are mentioned in paragraph 2 of the introduction to the non-
OECD economies’ positions included in the 2010 version of the OECD Model. 
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importing countries should be expected to have included more reservations to the OECD Model, 
for instance in order to reserve their right to tax certain types of income at source or with respect 
to the definition of permanent establishment (Art. 5), since a broader definition would increase 
the number of cases in which business profits could be taxed in the country of source2
 
. 
Given that most tax treaties are bilateral, it is important to note that being a net capital importing 
or exporting country will depend on the other party in the treaty, while reservations to the model 
are made in general, without considering any specific case. Thus, introducing a reservation to the 
model should be influenced by the general position of a country as a net capital importer or 
exporter, regardless of any specific treaty partner. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Countries with high net royalty payments are expected to have a higher number of 
reservations. 
 
According to Art. 12(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention, royalties are only taxable in the 
country of residence of the taxpayer. Exceptionally, Art. 12(3) accepts the possibility of taxing 
royalties in the country of source if they arise through a permanent establishment. However, the 
United Nations Model Tax Convention establishes that, in addition to taxation in the country of 
residence of the taxpayer, royalties may also be taxed up to a certain limit in the country in which 
they arise [Art. 12(2)]. Therefore, it would be logical to expect that countries which make net 
royalty payments (this would be the case of most developing countries, since they will tend to be 
net technology importers) would include more reservations to Art. 12 of the OECD Model. 
 
Hypothesis 3. OECD member States are expected to have fewer reservations than non-members. 
 
It is logical to expect that the OECD Model Tax Convention is particularly adapted to the needs 
of OECD member States, which are in general countries with common characteristics such as a 
high GDP per capita. Therefore, these countries should have included fewer reservations.  
 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the total annual GDP, the lower the number of reservations. 
 
This hypothesis is based on the idea that those countries with a higher GDP will be more 
influential during negotiations over the Model. Thus, they will disagree with fewer aspects of its 
content. In the case of the OECD member States, this influence could be explained by the fact that 
budget contributions to the OECD depend on the GDP of each member. Contrary to GDP per 
capita, the level of overall GDP measures the size of an economy and not the level of 
development of a country.  
                                                        
2 It should not be excluded that certain countries, such as the United States, may have included reservations for 
the opposite reason, that is, because they would prefer to favour the principle of taxation in the country of 
residence more than the OECD Model favours it.  
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Hypothesis 5. The broader a country’s tax treaty network, the higher the number of reservations. 
 
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that those countries with more tax treaties in force 
will pay more attention to international tax matters and, therefore, will include more reservations 
than those countries with a small tax treaty network. Moreover, the new OECD Model may lead 
to a re-interpretation and renegotiation of existing treaties. Therefore, countries with more tax 
treaties in force may have a stronger incentive to include reservations manifesting their 
disagreement with certain aspects of the new version of the model.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Countries with a more open economy are expected to include more reservations to 
the OECD Model. 
 
For countries with a more open economy (defined as the sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP), double taxation will be a more common problem. Thus, these countries will 
likely pay more attention to the development of the OECD Model and will present more 
reservations if they do not agree with a certain aspect. In contrast, this should not be a priority for 
countries with a more closed economy.  
 
Hypothesis 7. The higher the fiscal pressure in a country, the higher the number of reservations. 
 
Double taxation will be a particularly serious disadvantage for countries which already have high 
fiscal pressure. In these cases, double taxation may even prevent certain economic transactions 
from taking place. In contrast, in countries with very low fiscal pressure, double taxation may not 
be such a serious disadvantage. Therefore, countries with higher fiscal pressure should be 
expected to pay more attention to the elimination of double taxation and thus, to include more 
reservations in case of disagreement, while countries with low fiscal pressure may not play such 
an active role in drafting the model and would ignore its development. 
 
Hypothesis 8. Common law countries are expected to have fewer reservations than countries 
with other legal backgrounds. 
 
This hypothesis assumes that the OECD Model is better adapted to the domestic legal systems of 
common law countries than to other legal backgrounds (civil law, socialist law…). Thus, 
countries with other legal traditions may introduce reservations for domestic legal reasons. For 
instance, some countries have included reservations to the model because certain expressions 
(such as “company”, “trust” or “nationality”) are differently defined in their domestic legislation 
or are not used at all (for example, the term “capital” does not exist in the legal system of 
Belarus). 
 
Apart from the reasons explored in our above hypotheses, there may be other factors influencing 
the number of reservations introduced by a country which are difficult to test empirically due to 
the lack of available data. For instance, the personal characteristics of the delegates who 
participate in the negotiations, such as their experience or degree of technical expertise, may 
further explain why certain States have included more reservations than others. 
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3. Data description and estimation approach 
 
Our dependent variable is the number of reservations expressed by each country to the articles of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention published in July 2010. As mentioned in section 1, for non-
member States these disagreements are referred to as “positions” on articles, but since they have 
the same purpose as the reservations included by member States, we will use the term 
“reservations” in a broad sense, to refer also to positions by non-members. According to our data, 
the average number of reservations per country was 15.63 with a maximum of 46. For purposes 
of precision, for certain hypotheses the dependent variable we will consider is the number of 
reservations to the article which is most closely related to the hypothesis being tested. In this 
paper we do not explicitly refer to observations some countries made on the commentary, 
however, our findings would have been very similar. 
 
With respect to the population of our analysis, as we justified in section 1, we are considering all 
OECD member States and those non-members which participated in updating the OECD Model 
with the inclusion of at least one reservation. We have data on the 32 members of the OECD as of 
July 2010 and the 31 non-members which expressed their disagreement with certain provisions of 
the model. 
 
Since to our knowledge we are the first to attempt to analyze the possible reasons for introducing 
reservations to the articles of the OECD Model, we had first to identify potential explanatory 
variables. Basically, we are testing whether the variation in our independent variables can 
explain the variation in our dependent variable, namely the number of reservations to the 
articles. It turns out that the number of reservations is considerably lower for OECD member 
States than for non-members. Thus, we decided to conduct a cross-section analysis. Since our 
dependent variable is a positive integer we have used count data models with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors3. In particular, we use the Negative Binomial regression model to account 
for the overdispersion of the count variable4
E(reservi ) = exp(α + βMi + χZi ) 
. Thus, our objective is to estimate the following 
equation: 
 
where reservi is the number of reservations to articles of country i, Mi is a vector of variables 
proxying for the hypotheses outlined before, and Zi is a vector of control variables of country i. 
The detailed information about the variables which we are using can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
Throughout all regressions we control for OECD membership. This makes it possible to adjust for 
the differences between the two groups of countries. We have also used the level of GDP per 
capita instead of OECD membership as a robustness check. Because many variables are right-
                                                        
3 Since count data models are calculated by maximum likelihood (ML) and it might not be completely accurate to 
use ML with samples smaller than 100 observations, we also applied OLS with a logarithmic transformation of 
the dependent variable to check the robustness of the results. All results from the count data models were 
confirmed and the results of the OLS regressions can be provided on demand.  
 
4 See, for example, CAMERON (2005). 
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skewed, we have where appropriate performed logarithmic transformations to account for this 
asymmetry in the distribution. 
 
Hypothesis 1 relates the number of reservations to being a net capital importer or exporter. In 
order to test this hypothesis we have used data on net foreign direct investment (FDI) available 
from the World Bank. Moreover, in order to account for the relative importance of net FDI to the 
economy of a country, we will also consider the ratio of FDI to GDP. 
 
With respect to hypothesis 2, which relates net royalty payments to the number of reservations, 
we have used data on royalty payments compiled by the World Bank. In particular, we have 
used the amount of royalty receipts, royalty payments and net royalty payments (payments 
minus receipts) as a percentage of GDP. This would better account for the relevance of royalties 
in the context of a certain economy. 
 
In order to test hypothesis 3 we have distinguished between OECD member and non-member 
States in July 2010 (date of the latest version of the model). With respect to hypothesis 4 we have 
used data for GDP in 2009, the year before the current model was approved.  
 
To check hypothesis 5 we have considered the total number of tax treaties on income and capital 
in force in June 2010 which are available on the database of the International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation. With regard to hypothesis 6, as a measure of the openness of a country’s 
economy we have used the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of a country’s GDP, 
information which is available from the World Bank. This institution also provides the necessary 
data to test the influence of fiscal pressure (hypothesis 7). In particular, we have taken into 
account the total tax rate (as a percentage of profits) payable by businesses, the highest marginal 
tax rate on corporate income and the highest marginal tax rate on individuals’ income. Finally, to 
test hypothesis 8 we have used the classification of legal systems presented by LA PORTA et al. 
(1999). 
 
Of the bivariate correlations of the variables being used (Appendix 3), OECD membership is the 
one which correlates most strongly with the total number of reservations. This correlation is 
negative (more developed countries tend to have fewer reservations to the OECD Model). In this 
sense, OECD membership and GDP per capita are strongly and positively correlated with each 
other (correlation coefficient of 0.6659). Moreover, other explanatory variables which we are 
using also correlate moderately with GDP per capita and OECD membership, such as royalty 
receipts as a percentage of GDP, GDP in current US dollars, tax treaties in force and FDI. 
 
 
4. Estimation results and interpretation 
 
In order to test hypothesis 1 we will use as a dependent variable the number of reservations to 
Art. 5 of the OECD Model, which defines the notion of permanent establishment. The reason for 
this is that this concept is very relevant for the taxation of FDI. If these investments take place 
through a permanent establishment, the profits that can be attributed to this permanent 
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establishment will be taxed at source. Otherwise, profits obtained without a permanent 
establishment will be taxed in the country of residence of the taxpayer. 
 
The results presented in the following table show that, after controlling for OECD membership, 
the variable measuring FDI in net terms has a positive effect in the number of reservations to Art. 
5 of the OECD Model, but it is not statistically significant at standard levels5. However, if we look 
at FDI as percentage of a country’s GDP, the effect becomes significant at a 10% significance level, 
which is reasonable taking into account the sample size. Increasing the ratio by 10 percentage 
points would increase the number of reservations on average by 1.16. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis cannot be rejected7
 
. 
 (1) (2) 
 res_art_5 res_art_5 
oecd -1.287*** -1.235*** 
 (-4.65) (-4.38) 
fdi_net_stock † 0.0076  
 (1.12)  
fdi_net_percGDP  4.105* 
  (1.83) 
_cons 1.441*** 1.370*** 
 (9.66) (8.21) 
N 59 59 
Log pseudolikelihood -115.01 -114.52 
z statistics in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Regressions using robust standard errors. 
† in million US $. 
 
TABLE 1. Regressions concerning hypothesis 1. 
 
With respect to hypothesis 2, we will focus on the relation between royalty payments as a 
percentage of GDP and the number of reservations to Art. 12 of the OECD Model, since this 
provision deals exclusively with the taxation of royalties. In particular, to analyze the role of 
royalty payments we have three variables: royalty receipts as a percentage of GDP, royalty 
payments as a percentage of GDP and net royalty payments (payments minus receipts) as a 
percentage of GDP.  
 
                                                        
5 The relatively high standard errors in the case of the Negative Binomial model can be partially explained by the 
small sample size. OLS regressions with a logarithmically transformed dependent variable show similar results 
for the coefficients but with somewhat smaller standard errors. 
 
6 Average marginal effects were calculated in STATA using the command margins. 
 
7 We have also used FDI in total levels and as percentage of GDP for longer time periods (1979-2009, 1989-2009, 
1995-2009), obtaining similar results. The ratio of FDI to GDP remained fairly constant over the years. We report 
summary statistics for these variables in Appendix 2. 
InDret 4/2011 Alberto Vega and Ilja Rudyk 
 
11 
 
After controlling for OECD membership, the coefficients of the three aforementioned variables 
are in all cases negative, although according to our hypothesis, countries which make important 
royalty payments (especially in net terms) should have included more reservations to the model. 
Nevertheless, while the effect is highly significant in the case of royalty receipts, it is small and 
not significant at standard levels in the case of royalty payments. An increase in royalty receipts 
as a percentage of GDP by 0.1 percentage point reduces the number of reservations to Art. 12 on 
average by 0.858
 
.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 res_art12 res_art12 res_art12 
oecd -0.262 -0.767*** -0.853*** 
 (-1.44) (-3.47) (-4.08) 
roy_rec_percGDP -332.2***   
 (-5.212)   
roy_pay_percGDP  -65.90  
  (-1.40)  
roy_net_percGDP   -10.206 
   (-1.42) 
_cons 1.442*** 1.449*** 1.306*** 
 (19.71) (13.88) (16.18) 
N 53 54 53 
Log pseudolikelihood -82.30 -93.55 -94.59 
z statistics in parentheses.    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Regressions using robust standard errors.  
 
TABLE 2. Regressions concerning hypothesis 2. 
 
The regressions used to test the remaining hypotheses can be observed in Table 3. With respect to 
the role of OECD membership, which we are using as a control variable (regressions 2 to 7), it is 
clear that being an OECD member State is a factor associated with a lower number of 
reservations. Thus, we cannot reject hypothesis 3.  
 
In relation to hypothesis 4, we have introduced an interaction variable in order to capture the 
different effect that the variable ln_GDPcurrentUS$ may have on OECD member and non-
member States (regression 1). The reason is that this variable determines member  States’ budget 
contributions to the organization. Therefore, for OECD members this may be an additional 
influencing factor when drafting the model. However, the effect on both non-members and 
members is positive, which means that countries with a bigger economy tend to include more 
reservations, contrary to our initial hypothesis. In other words, this contradicts our expectation 
that States with a bigger economy would tend to be more influential during the negotiations and 
consequently would need to introduce fewer reservations. Nevertheless, the effect on non-
member states is significantly higher. A 10% increase in GDP would lead to an increase in the 
                                                        
8 Average marginal effects were calculated in STATA using the command margins. 
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number of reservations on average by 1.83 for non-member and 1.21 for member states9
 
. 
Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7 all have in common that they are based on the idea that for certain reasons 
(because of the existence of tax treaties which may have to be renegotiated or reinterpreted, or 
because the problem of double taxation will be more serious for those States with more open 
economies or higher fiscal pressure) some countries may pay more attention to double tax 
treaties and therefore will analyze the OECD Model more carefully and include more 
reservations to it if they disagree with a certain aspect, while others may just ignore it. However, 
after controlling for OECD membership, the effect of these variables on the number of 
reservations is no longer statistically significant at standard levels (regressions 3 to 6) and in 
some cases the coefficients do not have the expected sign (regressions 2, 3 and 6).  
 
Finally, hypothesis 8, according to which common law countries would tend to have fewer 
reservations to the OECD Model, must also be rejected. The coefficient is not statistically 
significant at standard levels and even positive (regression 7).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 res_art res_art res_art res_art res_art res_art res_art 
oecd  -0.934*** -0.817*** -0.863*** -0.864*** -0.724*** -0.879*** 
  (-6.03) (-4.75) (-5.27) (-5.51) (-3.50) (-5.60) 
ln_GDPcurrentUS$ 0.116**       
 (2.19)       
ln_GDPcurrentus _oecd -0.039***       
 (-5.79)       
ln_trade_GDP  -0.302*      
  (-1.95)      
tax_treaties   -0.003     
   (-0.95)     
max_tax_corp    0.0037    
    (0.31)    
ln_total_tax_rate     0.091   
     (0.27)   
max_tax_indiv      -0.011  
      (-1.25)  
common_law       0.216 
       (1.19) 
_cons 0.155 4.441*** 3.251*** 2.992 2.748** 3.367*** 3.055*** 
 (0.12) (6.67) (16.97) (10.46) (2.13) (14.15) (32.73) 
N 62 58 63 61 63 58 63 
Log pseudolikelihood -216.62 -202.79 -221.15 -213.69 -221.47 -201.97 -220.92 
z statistics in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Regressions using robust standard errors. 
 
TABLE 3. Regressions concerning hypotheses 3 to 8. 
 
                                                        
9 Average marginal effects were calculated in STATA using the command margins. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Summing up, the main factor that explains the number of reservations to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention is membership of the OECD (which is strongly correlated with GDP per capita). It 
has also been shown that, after controlling for OECD membership, countries with a high ratio of 
net FDI to GDP tend to have a higher number of reservations to Art. 5, which defines the concept 
of permanent establishment (fundamental for the taxation of business profits). Moreover, an 
increase in royalty receipts as a percentage of GDP is associated with fewer reservations to Art. 
12. Thus, this situation reflects that the OECD Model, despite having a worldwide influence, may 
favour the interests of net capital exporting countries, which are normally the most developed 
States. 
 
However, other factors that could explain the number of reservations to the OECD Model have 
not proved to be relevant. For instance, countries with a higher GDP (and thus higher budget 
contributions to the OECD in the case of member States) do not seem to be more influential than 
countries with smaller economies because their number of reservations is not significantly lower 
at standard levels. Similarly, having a wider tax treaty network, a more open economy or higher 
fiscal pressure do not seem to be factors associated with a higher number of reservations. 
 
Further research should consider alternative hypotheses to explain the number of reservations of 
each country to the OECD Model. Moreover, given that many of the independent variables which 
we have used are interrelated, further analysis should focus on the separation of the effects of 
each one.  
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Appendix 1. Definition of the variables 
 
Dependent variables  
res_art Total number of reservations to articles of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (version of July 2010) by OECD member States or total 
number of positions to articles by non-members. 
res_art5 Total number of reservations to Art. 5 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (version of July 2010) by OECD member States or total 
number of positions to Art. 5 by non-members. 
res_art12 Total number of reservations to Art. 12 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention (version of July 2010) by OECD member States or total 
number of positions to Art. 12 by non-members. 
Independent variables 
budget_contribution(%) OECD member State’s percentage share to Part I budget 
contributions (programmes of general interest) for 2010. Source: 
OECD (http://www.oecd.org). 
common_law Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country belongs to the 
English or common law legal family. Source: LA PORTA et al. (1999). 
fdi_net_percGDP Total net foreign direct investment (FDI), that is, net FDI in the 
reporting economy from foreign sources minus net FDI by the 
reporting economy to the rest of the world, as a percentage of the 
GDP (2009). Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1979_09 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1989_09 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1995_09 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_2002_09 
Ratio of total net foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP for the 
periods 1979-2009, 1989-2009, 1995-2009 and 2002-2009. Source: 
World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
fdi_net_stock Total net foreign direct investment (FDI), that is, net FDI in the 
reporting economy from foreign sources minus net FDI by the 
reporting economy to the rest of the world, 2009. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
fdi_net_stock_ 1979_09 
fdi_net_stock_ 1989_09 
fdi_net_stock_ 1995_09 
fdi_net_stock_ 2002_09 
Total net foreign direct investment (FDI), that is, net FDI in the 
reporting economy from foreign sources minus net FDI by the 
reporting economy to the rest of the world, for the periods 1979-
2009, 1989-2009, 1995-2009 and 2002-2009. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
ln_GDP_capita Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita at purchaser’s prices 
(current US dollars), 2009. Source: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/).  
ln_total_tax_rate Total amount of taxes payable by businesses (except for labor taxes) 
after accounting for deductions and exemptions as a percentage of 
profit, 2009 (natural logarithm). Source: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
ln_trade_GDP Natural logarithm of the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
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services measured as a share of gross domestic product, 2009. 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/). 
lnGDPcurrentUS$ Natural logarithm of the GDP at purchaser’s prices (current US 
dollars), 2009. Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).  
lnGDPcurrentus_OECD Interaction variable defined as: lnGDPcurrentus * oecd 
max_tax_corp Highest rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the 
taxable income of corporations, 2009. Source: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
max_tax_indiv Highest rate shown on the schedule of tax rates applied to the 
taxable income of individuals, 2009. Source: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
oecd Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country is a member 
state of the OECD (July 2010) and 0 otherwise. 
royalties_net_percGDP Net payments (payments – receipts) between residents and 
nonresidents for the authorized use of intangible, nonproduced, 
nonfinancial assets and property rights (such as patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, industrial processes and franchises) and for the use, 
through licensing agreements, of produced originals of prototypes 
(such as films and manuscripts). Data in current U.S. dollars, 2009, as 
a percentage of the GDP. Source: World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
royalties_pay_percGDP Payments from residents to nonresidents for the authorized use of 
intangible, nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and property rights 
(such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes and 
franchises) and for the use, through licensing agreements, of 
produced originals of prototypes (such as films and manuscripts). 
Data in current U.S. dollars, 2009, as a percentage of the GDP. 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).  
royalties_rec_percGDP Royalty receipts from nonresidents for the authorized use of 
intangible, nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and property rights 
(such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial processes and 
franchises) and for the use, through licensing agreements, of 
produced originals of prototypes (such as films and manuscripts). 
Data in current U.S. dollars, 2009, as a percentage of the GDP. 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).  
tax_treaties Total number of tax treaties for the elimination of double taxation on 
income and capital in force (30/6/2010). Multilateral treaties (such 
as the Nordic Convention) are also counted as one treaty. Source: 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (Database IBFD Tax 
Research Platform, http://www.ibfd.org). 
 
 
 
InDret 4/2011 Alberto Vega and Ilja Rudyk 
 
17 
 
Appendix 2. Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
res_art 63 15.63 11.32 0.00 46.00 
res_art5 63 2.76 3.06 0.00 11.00 
res_art12 63 2.43 1.87 0.00 6.00 
budget_contribution(%) 30 3.33 4.88 0.20 23.90 
common_law 63 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
fdi_net_stock  † 59 -4.13 25.20 -133.97 39.83 
fdi_net_stock_2002_09 † 61 -19.89 139.67 -551.09 521.94 
fdi_net_stock_1995_09 ‡ 61 -18.25375 193.4647 -637.431 788.463 
fdi_net_stock_1989_09 ‡ 61 -22.50323 218.220 -715.284 859.244 
fdi_net_stock_1979_09 ‡ 61 -23.90621 229.147 -813.419 867.765 
fdi_net_perc_GDP 59 -0.001 0.082 -0.549 0.098 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_2002_09 61 0.006 0.071 -0.464 0.166 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1995_09 61 0.096 0.053 -0.325 0.137 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1989_09 61 0.009 0.046 -0.275 0.111 
fdi_net_perc_GDP_1979_09 61 0.009 0.041 -0.249 0.078 
ln_GDPcurrentUS$  62 26.15 1.69 22.89 30.28 
roy_rec_percGDP 53 0.002 0.002 0.00 0.0116 
roy_pay_percGDP  54 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.15 
roy_net_percGDP 53 0.004 0.020 -0.007 0.146 
max_tax_indiv  58 33.40 13.50 0.00 62.28 
max_tax_corp  61 25.40 8.15 10.00 55.00 
total_tax_rate 63 49.13 35.14 14.10 293.30 
ln_total_tax_rate 63 3.81 0.41 2.71 5.68 
tax_treaties 63 58.44 25.72 0.00 120.00 
trade_GDP 58 84.69 48.18 22.62 305.57 
ln_trade_GDP  58 4.32 0.51 3.16 5.73 
oecd 63 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
† in million US$. 
‡ in billion US$. 
     
 
TABLE 4. Summary statistics. 
 
InDret 4/2011 Alberto Vega and Ilja Rudyk 
 
18 
 
Appendix 3. Bivariate correlations 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) res_art_5 1.000 0.222 -0.537 0.229 
(n) 63 59 63 59 
(2) fdi_net_stock 0.222 1.000 -0.332 0.268 
(n) 59 59 59 59 
(3) oecd -0.537 -0.332 1.000 -0.311 
(n) 63 59 63 59 
(4) fdi_net_percGDP 0.229       0.268       -0.311       1.000 
(n) 59 59 59 59 
 
TABLE 5. Bivariate correlations. Variables used in the regressions to test the influence of FDI on reservations to 
Art. 5 of the OECD Model. 
 
 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) res_art_12 1.000 -0.680 -0.226 -0.150 -0.559 
(n) 63 53 54 53 63 
(2) roy_rec_percGDP -0.680 1.000 0.338  0.217  0.542 
(n) 53 53 53 53 53 
(3) roy_pay_percGDP -0.226 0.338 1.000 0.992   0.161 
(n) 54 53 54 53 54 
(4) roy_net_percGDP  -0.150  0.217       0.992       1.000       0.101 
(n) 53 53 53 53 53 
(5) oecd -0.559 0.542 0.161  0.101  1.000 
(n) 63 53 54 53 63 
 
TABLE 6. Bivariate correlations. Variables used in the regressions to test the influence of royalty payments to 
reservations to Art. 12 of the OECD Model. 
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) res_art 1.000 0.251 -0.575 0.104 -0.085 -0.172 -0.284 -0.020 0.096 -0.383 
(n) 63 30 63 63 62 58 63 61 63 58 
(2) budget_contribution 0.251 1.000 . 0.325 0.784 -0.630 0.172 0.677 0.248 0.065 
(n) 30 30 30 30 30 28 30 30 30 30 
(3) oecd -0.575 . 1.000 -0.047 0.440 0.084 0.454 0.059 -0.109 0.534 
(n) 63 30 63 63 62 58 63 61 63 58 
(4) common_law 0.104 0.325 -0.047 1.000 0.264 -0.054 0.010 0.319 -0.310 -0.019 
(n) 62 30 62 62 62 58 62 60 62 57 
(5) ln_GDPcurrentUS$ -0.085 0.784 0.440 0.264 1.000 -0.432 0.634 0.476 0.060 0.342 
(n) 62 30 62 62 62 58 62 60 62 57 
(6) ln_trade_GDP -0.172 -0.630 0.084 -0.054 -0.432 1.000 0.085 -0.464 -0.429 -0.064 
(n) 58 28 58 58 58 58 58 56 58 53 
(7) tax_treaties -0.284 0.172 0.454 0.010 0.634 0.085 1.000 0.072 -0.039 0.272 
(n) 63 30 63 63 62 58 63 61 63 58 
(8) max_tax_corp -0.020 0.677 0.059 0.319 0.476 -0.464 0.072 1.000 0.226 0.203 
(n) 61 30 61 61 60 56 61 61 61 58 
(9) ln_total_tax_rate 0.096 0.248 -0.109 -0.310 0.060 -0.429 -0.039 0.226 1.000 0.222 
(n) 63 30 63 63 62 58 63 61 63 58 
(10) max_tax_indiv -0.383 0.065 0.534 -0.019 0.342 -0.064 0.272 0.203 0.222 1.000 
(n) 58 30 58 58 57 53 58 58 58 58 
 
TABLE 7. Bivariate correlations. Variables used in the regressions to test hypotheses 3 to 8. 
